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Abstract
Social goods are goods that grant value not only to their owners but also to the owners’ sur-
roundings, be it their families, friends or office mates. The benefit a non-owner derives from the
good is affected by many factors, including the type of the good, its availability, and the social
status of the non-owner. Depending on the magnitude of the benefit and on the price of the
good, a potential buyer might stay away from purchasing the good, hoping to free ride on others’
purchases. A revenue-maximizing seller who sells social goods must take these considerations into
account when setting prices for the good. The literature on optimal pricing has advanced consid-
erably over the last decade, but little is known about optimal pricing schemes for selling social
goods. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of revenue-maximizing pricing schemes for
social goods: we introduce a Bayesian model for this scenario, and devise nearly-optimal pricing
schemes for various types of externalities, both for simultaneous sales and for sequential sales.
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs...
1 Introduction
Many goods exhibit a positive externality not only on their owner, but also on other parties.
For instance, a coffee machine purchased by an employee benefits all of her office mates, and
essentially reduces the probability of another coffee machine to be purchased. Examples of
these kinds of goods are abundant: A high-schooler who has many friends with cars that can
drive him around might be less tempted to buy a new car. A reputable store might draw
large customer traffic and benefit other stores in the shopping mall. Therefore, an aggressive
advertising campaign carried out by such a store might reduce the likelihood of another store
running a campaign in parallel. In all of these scenarios the externalities depend on the type
of good, on the social status of the party with whom the good is shared, and on the set of
parties who own the good. In the coffee machine example, the machine is typically used by
all the individuals sharing the office space. In the shopping mall, some types of stores (e.g.,
fast food restaurants) might benefit from any traffic in the shopping mall, whereas more
specialized stores may benefit from ad campaigns that draw costumers interested in a similar
kind of product (e.g., Staples may attract costumers similar to those interested in Office
Depot products). The benefit of a high school student depends on his social status and on
the set of friends who own a car.
Because of the abundance of goods that exhibit externalities similar to the ones in the
examples above, their study is of great applicability. We term these goods social goods. When
selling social goods, a seller must take into account the types of buyers in the market and
the benefit they derive from other sets of buyers purchasing the good. Our main goal is to
study how to sell goods in a way that approximately maximizes the seller’s revenue in the
presence of externalities.
To study this problem, we consider a setting with a single type of good, of unlimited
supply, and a set of n agents; each agent i ∈ [n] has a non-negative valuation vi for purchasing
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the good, drawn independently from a distribution Fi. We denote the product distribution
by F = ×i∈[n]Fi. Unless stated otherwise, we assume the Fi’s are regular.1
If an agent does not purchase the good, but the good is purchased by others, then this
agent derives only a fraction of her value, depending on the set of agents and the type
of externality the good exhibits on the agent. This type of externality is captured in our
model by an externality function xi : 2[n] → [0, 1], where xi(S) denotes the fraction of vi an
agent i derives when the good is purchased by the set of agents S. We assume that xi is
publicly known (as it captures the agent’s externalities), monotonically non-decreasing and
normalized; i.e., xi(∅) = 0, for every T ⊆ S, xi(T ) ≤ xi(S), and xi(S) = 1 whenever i ∈ S.
We consider three structures of the function xi, corresponding to three types of externalities
of social goods.
(a) Full externalities (commonly known as “public goods"): in this scenario all agents derive
their entire value if the good is purchased by any agent. Therefore, xi(S) = 1 if and only
if S 6= ∅. This model captures goods that are non-excludable, such as a coffee machine
in a shared office. A special case of this scenario, where valuations are independently
and identically distributed, has been studied in [10].
(b) Status-based externalities: in this scenario, agent i’s “social status" is captured by some
discount factor wi ∈ [0, 1], which corresponds to the fraction of the value an agent i
derives from a good when purchased by another party. That is,
xi(S) =

1 i ∈ S,
wi i /∈ S and S 6= ∅,
0 otherwise.
(1)
This model captures settings that exhibit asymmetry with respect to the benefit different
agents derive from goods they do not own (e.g., a fast food restaurant or a popular
high-school student in the above examples).
(c) Availability-based externalities: in this scenario, the availability of a good increases as
more agents purchase a good, and therefore, an agent derives a larger fraction of her
value as more agents purchase a good. This is captured by the following externality
function.
xi(S) =
{
1 i ∈ S,
w(|S|) i /∈ S. (2)
Here, w : {0, . . . , n−1} → [0, 1] is a monotonically non-decreasing function with w(0) = 0.
Examples of such scenarios include objects that are often shared by neighbors (e.g., snow
blowers, lawn mowers), office supplies, etc.
Notice that the full externalities scenario is a special case of both the social-status (where
wi = 1 for every i) and the availability (where w(k) = 1 for every k > 0) models.
Our focus is on posted-price mechanisms, which exhibit many desired properties: they are
simple, distributed, straightforward, and strategyproof. Our goal is to maximize the revenue
extracted by the seller. We distinguish between discriminatory and non-discriminatory prices.
Naturally, using discriminatory prices can often lead to higher revenue for the seller [19, 15].
Price discrimination is commonly used in the US [12], but user studies reveal that many
1 This means that the virtual valuation function φ(v) = v− 1−F (v)f(v) is non-decreasing. See Appendix A in
the full version.
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users believe that this practice is illegal, and consider these acts to be an invasion of privacy
[5]. Therefore, offering non-discriminatory prices may be critical for maintaining the seller’s
reputation. We show scenarios in which setting the same price for all users produces (almost)
as much revenue as engaging in price discrimination.
We consider two natural sale models: (a) a simultaneous sale, where the seller simultan-
eously sets take-it-or-leave-it prices for all agents, after which agents play a simultaneous
Bayesian game, and each agent decides whether or not to buy at the price offered to her;
and (b) a sequential sale, in which the agents arrive sequentially, and each one is offered a
take-it-or-leave-it price upon arrival. In this case, the price and the agent’s decision may
depend on the set of agents that purchased the good before the arrival of the current agent.
We distinguish between adaptive and non-adaptive pricing schemes, which differ in whether
the price can depend upon the set of agents who purchased the good prior to the agent’s
arrival.
In both simultaneous and sequential sales, assuming that agent i is offered a take-it-or-
leave-it price pi, and that the good is eventually purchased by a set S ⊆ [n] of agents, the
utility of agent i is:
ui(S, pi) =
{
vi − pi if i ∈ S,
vi · xi(S) if i /∈ S.
(3)
As shown in Section 2, a set of prices induces equilibria of the game (multiple equilibria
in the simultaneous model, and a single one in the sequential model). Every equilibrium is
characterized by a set of threshold strategies for the agents, where an agent buys the good if
and only if her value exceeds the threshold.
1.1 Our contribution
We provide results for the three models described above (See Fig. 1).
(a) Full externalities.
Theorem (informal): There exist poly-time algorithms for computing pricing schemes
for settings with full externalities that give a constant factor approximation to the optimal
pricing scheme, for both simultaneous and sequential sales. Moreover, this result can be
achieved using non-discriminatory prices, despite asymmetry among buyers.
To derive this result, we first analyze the equilibria in simultaneous and sequential models.
We show a surprising equivalence between the revenue attainable in the best equilibrium
at simultaneous and sequential sales, albeit induced by different prices. A corollary of this
equivalence is that the optimal attainable revenue at a sequential sale does not depend on
the order of agents. Furthermore, we observe that in both simultaneous and sequential sales,
the revenue attainable is upper bounded by the optimal revenue from selling a single private
good (i.e., a good that grants value only to their owners)2.
We proceed as follows. For simultaneous sales, we establish a method for transforming
prices for the sale of a single private good in expectation into prices for selling public goods,
which preserve the revenue up to a constant factor in every equilibrium. Since selling a single
2 A similar argument was used in [10] for the special case of simultaneous sales where valuations are
identically distributed.
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good in expectation yields at least as much revenue as selling a single good deterministically,
this implies a near-optimal pricing scheme for simultaneous sales of public goods.
For sequential sales, we use the theory of prophet inequalities. Consider prices that
induce thresholds that are equal to the prices that emerge from the prophet inequalities. We
show that such prices obtain at least half of the revenue that is obtained from the prophet
inequalities prices in the private good model. We use this connection to obtain a pricing
scheme that gives 4-approximation to the revenue of the optimal sequential sale of public
goods.
Finally, we show how to compute nearly-optimal non-discriminatory prices, even for
asymmetric agents, in both the simultaneous and sequential models.
(b) Status-based externalities.
Theorem (informal): There exist poly-time algorithms for computing pricing schemes for
settings with status-based externalities that give a constant factor approximation to the
optimal pricing scheme, for both simultaneous and sequential sales.3
For sequential sales, we devise a non-adaptive pricing scheme, while the benchmark is the
optimal adaptive pricing scheme. To obtain this result, we first show that a seller who is
restricted to set only two prices per agent can extract as much revenue as one who can present
exponentially many prices. We then show that the optimal revenue in this simpler case can
be decomposed into two components: a private component (monotonically decreasing in the
agents’ discount factors) and a public component (monotonically increasing in the discount
factors). The private component can be approximated by simulating n private sales, setting
thresholds equal to the monopoly prices. The public component can be approximated by
similar techniques to the ones introduced for public goods. Therefore, the better of the two
mechanisms extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. A similar decomposition
technique is established for the case of simultaneous sales. Our result for the sequential case
is essentially a reduction: given prices that yield a c-approximation for the optimal sequential
sale in the full externalities model, one can find prices that (c+ 2)-approximate the optimal
sequential sale in the status-based externalities model.
(c) Availability-based externalities.
Theorem (informal): There exists a poly-time algorithm for computing a pricing scheme
for sequential sales with availability-based externalities, that gives a logarithmic factor
approximation (with regard to the number of buyers) to the optimal pricing scheme.
In this case, both the pricing scheme and the benchmark set a pricing function for each
agent, which depends on the number of agents who have purchased the good before the
arrival of the agent. To obtain this result, we decompose the revenue into n components.
Component k = 1, . . . , n is upper bounded by the optimal revenue obtainable by selling k
identical private goods, scaled by w(k)− w(k − 1). We then partition the components into
buckets, and compute prices based on the sequential posted pricing scheme developed by
Chawla et al. [8] for selling private goods.
General externalities. Given the near-optimal pricing schemes above, one may be tempted
3 We note that no non-discriminatory prices can achieve a constant approximation in this model. Indeed,
the case of private digital goods is a special case of this model, with wi = 0 for every i.
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to infer that every social goods scenario is amenable to a near-optimal pricing scheme. We
complement our positive results with the following hardness result, refuting this hope. We
consider a natural family of social goods proposed by Feldman et al. [10]: network-based
externalities. In this model, externalities are represented by a graph, and an agent derives
her entire value when a neighboring agent buys a good. We show that there is no poly-time
algorithm to compute prices that give a non-trivial approximation to the optimal posted-price
mechanism. This negative result holds for both the simultaneous and sequential models. We
show that even in very restricted cases (i.e., where agents’ valuations are independently and
uniformly distributed on [0, 1] in the simultaneous case, and agents’ valuations are fixed in
the sequential case), it is NP-hard to find prices that approximate the optimal posted-price
mechanism to within a factor of n1−. A Θ(n) approximation can be trivially achieved by
offering the good only to the agent maximizing the monopolist revenue. We note that this
negative result rules out other natural externality structures.4
Irregular distributions. Although our results are stated and proved for regular distri-
butions, some of our results extend to irregular distributions. Namely, we establish near
optimal pricing schemes for sequential and simultaneous sales under full externalities and
status-based externalities. The results of non-discriminatory prices do not extend to irregular
distributions since the anonymous pricing devised in [4] do not perform well for irregular
distributions. (As shown in [4], there exist irregular distributions that do not admit any
anonymous prices that give constant approximation.)
Simultaneous Sequential
discriminatory non-discriminatory discriminatory non-discriminatory
Full (Public goods) i.i.d. ≥ 4/e Thm. B.1 4 Thm. B.2 - 4 Thm. B.2
non i.i.d. 5.83 Thm. 3.5 4e Cor. 3.8 4 Thm. 3.6 4e Cor. 3.8
Status-based 6.83 Thm. 4.6 Ω(logn) App. G 6 Cor. 4.5 Ω(logn) App. G
availability-based - - O(logn) Thm. 5.1 -
network-based Ω
(
n1−
)
Thm. 6.2 - Ω
(
n1−
)
Thm. 6.3 -
Figure 1 Summary of our results for pricing mechanism for social goods. The columns correspond
to sale models, whereas the rows correspond to types of externalities. The rows are further divided
to sales using discriminatory and non-discriminatory prices.
1.2 Related work
The most famous and well studied instance of social goods is public goods, when all agents
derive their full value whenever a good is purchased. The study of public goods was initiated
by Samuelson [20], who observed that private provisioning of public goods is not necessarily
efficient; see also [18] for an overview.
The closest work to ours is that of Feldman et al. [10]. For their positive results,
they consider a special case of our full externalities model — in their model agents arrive
simultaneously with valuations that are drawn independently and identically from a known
distribution. Our work extends this work in several dimensions. First, we consider more
realistic forms of externalities that go beyond public goods. Second, we consider settings
where agent valuations are drawn from non-identical distributions. Third, we provide results
4 Some examples include: (a) for every pair of agents i, j, agent i can borrow the good from agent j
with some probability wij . Thus, xi(S) = 1−
∏
j∈S,j 6=i(1− wij); and (b) for every pair of agents i, j,
xi(S) = maxj∈S,j 6=i wij .
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for settings where agents arrive either sequentially or simultaneously. Finally, some of our
results extend to irregular distributions.
A line of work similar in flavor to ours, yet inherently different, is that of revenue
maximization in the presence of positive externalities [1, 11, 13, 2, 6]. In this line of work,
an agent’s value for the good increases as more agents purchase the goods, but only if the
agent purchased the good as well. Therefore, an agent is more likely to purchase the good
as more agents purchase it. This is in stark contrast to our setting, where agents are less
inclined to buy a good as more agents do.
Finally, there is a rich body of literature on the design of posted price mechanisms for
the sale of private goods (where agents do not derive value from goods they do not own).
See Chapter 4 in [14] for a textbook treatment. A sample of the work can be found in
[8, 4, 16, 9, 7]. An overview of some results that are directly referred to in this work is given
in Appendix A.
1.3 Organization
Model and preliminaries appear in Section 2. Our results for the full externalities model
appear in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our results for goods that exhibit status-based
externalities for sequential (Section 4.1) and simultaneous (Section 4.2) sales. Our results
for the availability-based externalities model appear in Section 5, and our hardness results
appear in Section 6. We discuss how to extend our results to irregular distributions in
Appendix F.
2 Models and preliminaries
Simultaneous sales model. We view a simultaneous sale game as the following two-stage
game. First, the seller posts a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) to the agents (agent i is offered
to purchase an item at price pi). Subsequently, the agents play a simultaneous Bayesian
game. In this model, we assume that the probability distribution of every agent is atomless.5
Agents wish to maximize their expected utility. Given a price pi, agent i buys the
good if her expected utility from buying, vi − pi, exceeds the utility from not buying,
vi ·ES 63i[xi(S)] (where ES 63i is shorthand for ES:i 6∈S). Therefore, an agent buys if and only if
vi ≥ pi1−ES 63i[xi(S)] =: Ti. The strategy of every agent i is therefore defined by a threshold Ti.
Denote by T = (T1, . . . , Tn) a strategy profile, given by a vector of thresholds. A strategy
profile T induces a probability distribution over the set S of agents that purchase the good;
denote this distribution by µT, and the distribution µT conditioned on i not being in the set
of purchasing agents by µ−iT . A Nash equilibrium is characterized by a threshold vector T
such that:
Ti =
pi
1− ES∼µ−iT [xi(S)]
∀i ∈ [n]. (4)
The following theorem establishes the existence of Nash equilibria via a fixed point
argument.
I Theorem 2.1. In the simultaneous model, for any set of externality functions {xi}i∈[n], for
any set of atomless distributions F , and for any price vector p, there exists an equilibrium T.
5 Meaning that for every q there exists p for which Fi(p) = q.
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Proof: Given a vector of probabilities q = (q1, . . . , qn) ∈ [0, 1]n we define ηq to be the
distribution over subsets of agents, where every agent i is in the subset independently with
probability 1− qi. We define η−iq as the distribution conditioned on agent i not being in the
sampled set. To simplify the proof, an expression with 0 in the denominator is regarded as
having value ∞, and Fi is extended to satisfy Fi(∞) = 1. Given a vector of probabilities q
we define a function
Φ(q) = Φ1(q)× Φ2(q)× . . .× Φn(q), where Φi(q ∈ [0, 1]n) = Fi
(
pi
1− ES∼η−iq [xi(S)]
)
.
Φ(q) is a function from [0, 1]n to [0, 1]n. Since the Fi’s are atomless, Φ is a continuous function
from a compact set to itself, and Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem applies. Thus, there exists
q ∈ [0, 1]n for which Φ(q) = q. Given a fixed point q, setting Ti := pi1−E
S∼η−iq
[xi(S)] yields
an equilibrium. This is true since for every i, qi = Fi(Ti), and therefore, η−iq = µ−iT , which
implies that the equilibrium condition defined in Eq. (4) holds.
One of the challenges in our model stems from the fact that a single price vector may
induce multiple equilibria. Consider the simple setting of a single public good and two agents,
Alice and Bob, where FAlice and FBob are both uniform on [0, 1], and the seller sets a non
discriminatory price of 1/2. Applying the equilibrium condition in Eq. (4), we get that every
tuple (TAlice, TBob) ∈ [0, 1]2 satisfying TAlice · TBob = 1/2 forms an equilibrium strategy.6
Therefore, in this case, there is a continuum of equilibria. It is not hard to see, however,
that a set of thresholds T can be the consequence of only a single price vector, which can be
derived via Eq. (4). This is cast in the following observation:
I Observation 2.2. In the simultaneous model, a given price vector can induce multiple
equilibria, but any given equilibrium T can be induced by a single price vector p.
Let Eq(F ,p) denote the set of equilibria induced by a price vector p, given a product dis-
tribution F . For a given price vector p and an equilibrium T ∈ Eq(F ,p), let Rsim(F ,p,T) =∑
i pi · (1− Fi(Ti)) denote the seller’s expected revenue. Given a price vector p, we define
Rsim(F ,p) = max
T∈Eq(F,p)
Rsim(F ,p,T) and Rsim(F ,p) = minT∈Eq(F,p)Rsim(F ,p,T)
to be the revenue obtained in the respective best and worst equilibrium induced by p. We
refer to these revenues as the optimistic and pessimistic revenues, respectively.
The strongest approximation results one can hope for are ones that consider the pessimistic
revenue obtained by our pricing scheme against an optimistic benchmark. This is exactly
the approach we take. In particular, our benchmark is the revenue obtained by the best
pricing, assuming the best equilibrium induced by every pricing. We denote the benchmark
by R∗sim(F) = maxp∗ Rsim(F ,p∗). The performance of a price vector p is measured by the
worst equilibrium induced by p; i.e., Rsim(F ,p). Our goal is to calculate a price vector p
that minimizes the ratio between the former and the latter expressions.
Sequential sales model. In the sequential sales model, n agents arrive one by one according
to an order σ : [n]→ [n], where agent i is the σ(i)th agent to arrive. For ease of notation,
we assume that agent i is the ith agent to arrive, unless explicitly stated otherwise. In
sequential sales, the price set by the seller for agent i can depend on the set of agents who
6 For a comprehensive discussion regarding the equilibrium condition in the public goods model, see
Eq.(5) in Section 3.
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have purchased the good prior to agent i’s arrival. Thus, it can be viewed as a function
pi : 2[i−1] → R+.7 The subgame perfect equilibrium in this auction is unique and can be
found by a (possibly exponential) backward induction. An agent who receives a price buys
if and only if her utility from buying exceeds her expected derived value from not buying
conditioned on the set of agents that purchased the good prior to her arrival. Of course, this
might impose a different threshold for every scenario which might lead to an exponential
strategy space for the agents and an exponential time to compute each threshold in the
strategy of an agent. As we discuss in the following sections, we devise pricing schemes in
which the seller has a simple nearly optimal pricing scheme which leads to a simple strategy
space and a poly-time threshold computation.
3 Pricing goods with full externalities (public goods)
In Section 3.1 we characterize the equilibrium in both simultaneous and sequential sales
models, and show an equivalence between the optimal posted prices revenue in both models.
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we describe the near optimal sequential and simultaneous sales, and
in Appendix 3.4 we show how to achieve a near optimal sale using non-discriminatory prices.
3.1 Equilibrium and revenue equivalence
In this section we focus on the case where all agents derive their entire value from a good if
purchased by any agent. We first characterize the equilibrium condition for a simultaneous
sale. Given an equilibrium T = (T1, . . . , Tn), the expected value agent i derives from other
agents is ES∼µ−iT [xi(S)] = 1 ∗ Pr [some agent j 6= i buys] = 1 − Pr [no agent j 6= i buys] =
1 − ∏j 6=i Fj(Tj). Plugging this expression into Eq. (4) yields the following equilibrium
condition:
Ti =
pi∏
j 6=i Fj(Tj)
for all i. (5)
For a given price vector p and an equilibrium T ∈ Eq(F ,p), the expected revenue is
Rsim(F ,p,T) =
∑
i
pi (1− Fi(Ti)) (5)=
∑
i
Ti ·
(∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
)
· (1− Fi(Ti)) . (6)
We turn to describe the equilibrium in the sequential sales model. In this case, whenever
an agent buys an item, no subsequent agent will ever buy an item. Therefore, we can assume
without loss of generality that the seller sets a single price per agent. Let p = (p1, . . . , pn)
denote the vector of offered prices.
We now show how to compute the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
When the last agent (agent n) is offered a price, her best strategy is to buy if her value
exceeds the price; i.e., Tn = pn. When agent i = n − 1, . . . , 1 is offered a price, she faces
the following tradeoff: if she buys, her utility is vi − pi. If she does not buy, her util-
ity is vi
(
1−∏j>i Pr [j does not buy]) = vi (1−∏j>i Fj(Tj)). Consequently, the unique
7 Indeed, there are cases where the seller can gain higher revenue by setting such prices (an explicit
example for availability-based externalities is given in Appendix H).
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equilibrium T is given by89
Ti =
pi∏
j>i Fj(Tj)
∀i ∈ [n]. (7)
Given a product distribution F , a price vector p, and an arrival order σ, let TF (σ,p) be the
function that returns the unique equilibrium. Since every price vector p defines a unique
strategy vector T, the expected revenue from agent i is also uniquely defined, and can be
calculated by∏
j<i
Pr [j does not buy] · pi · (1− Fi(Ti)) (7)=
(∏
j<i
Fj(Tj)
)
· Ti ·
(∏
j>i
Fj(Tj)
)
· (1− Fi(Ti))
= Ti ·
(∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
)
· (1− Fi(Ti)).
Therefore, the expected revenue from all agents can be written as
Rseq(F , σ,p,T = TF (σ,p)) =
∑
i
Ti ·
(∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
)
· (1− Fi(Ti)) . (8)
Given an arrival order σ, let R∗seq(F , σ) = maxpRseq(F , σ,p,T = TF (σ,p)) denote the
highest revenue a seller can obtain. We note that given a threshold vector T and an arrival
order σ, there is also a unique price vector that produces this threshold vector T, which can
be calculated by (7), thus TF (σ, ·) is a bijection. This is cast in the following observation.
I Observation 3.1. Fix an arrival order. An equilibrium strategy vector T is uniquely
determined by a price vector p, and a price vector p is uniquely determined by a strategy
vector T.
The following theorem establishes revenue equivalence in simultaneous and sequential
sales.
I Theorem 3.2. For every product distribution F and for every order of arrival σ in the
sequential model, we have that R∗seq(F , σ) = R∗sim(F).
Proof: By renaming, assume that the agents arrive according to their index. We prove
both directions.
R∗seq(F) ≤ R∗sim(F) :
Let pseq be a vector in argmaxpRseq(F ,p,T = TF (p)) and let TF (pseq) = Tseq =
(T seq1 , . . . , T seqn ) be the strategies used by the agents for the price vector. From (8) we
get that R∗seq(F) =
∑
i T
seq
i ·
∏
j 6=i Fj(T
seq
j ) · (1− Fi(T seqi )). According to Observation 2.2,
there exists a single price vector which yields this strategy vector in the simultaneous sales
model. We denote this price vector by psim. From (6), we get that Rsim(F ,psim,Tseq) =∑
i T
seq
i ·
∏
j 6=i Fj(T
seq
j )·(1− Fi(T seqi )). Since Rsim(F ,psim,Tseq) ≤ R∗sim(F), the inequality
follows.
R∗sim(F) ≤ R∗seq(F) :
Let psim be a price vector in argmaxpRsim(F ,p) and let Tsim =
(
T sim1 , . . . , T
sim
n
)
be the
8 Unlike the simultaneous model, an equilibrium exists for non atomless distributions, whenever tie-
breaking is done consistently by agents. That is, agents always take the same action when their value is
equal to their threshold.
9 For n, we let
∏
j>n
Fj(Tj) = 1.
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strategy vector that maximizes the revenue for this price vector, i.e., Tsim ∈ argmaxTRsim(F ,psim,T).
From (6) we haveR∗sim(F) = Rsim(F ,psim,Tsim) =
∑
i T
sim
i ·
∏
j 6=i Fj(T simj )·
(
1− Fi(T simi )
)
.
According to Observation (3.1), given an order of arrival of the agents, the strategy vector
Tsim is uniquely determined by a price vector pseq = T−1F (Tsim) in the sequential sales
model. From (8) we have Rseq(F ,pseq,Tsim) =
∑
i T
sim
i ·
∏
j 6=i Fj(T simj ) ·
(
1− Fi(T simi )
)
.
Since Rseq(F ,pseq,Tsim) ≤ R∗seq(F), the inequality follows.
It immediately follows that the optimal revenue is independent of the arrival order.
I Corollary 3.3. For every two arrival orders σ, σ′, R∗seq(F , σ) = R∗seq(F , σ′).
In the sequel, we use R∗seq(F) to denote the optimal revenue in the sequential model.
We next draw a connection between selling public goods and selling a single private good.
This connection is later used in proving approximation results for mechanisms for the sale
of public goods. Let Myer(F) denotes the optimal revenue a seller can obtain by selling a
single private good to a set of agents drawn from F (i.e., the revenue obtained by Myerson’s
optimal auction). Using similar arguments to ones used in [10], we have the following:
I Lemma 3.4. For every product distribution F , R∗seq(F) ≤ Myer(F)
(
and therefore,
R∗sim(F) ≤Myer(F) by Theorem 3.2
)
.
Proof: Let pseq be a vector in argmaxpRseq(F ,p,T = TF (p)) and let TF (pseq) = Tseq =
(T seq1 , . . . , T seqn ) be the equilibrium induced by the price vector pseq. We have that:
R∗seq(F)
(8)=
∑
i
T seqi ·
∏
j 6=i
Fj(T seqj ) · (1− Fi(T seqi ))
≤
∑
i
T seqi ·
∏
j<i
Fj(T seqj ) · (1− Fi(T seqi )) ≤Myer(F),
where the last inequality is due to the fact that the LHS expression is the expected revenue
out of a sequential posted prices mechanism where agent i is offered a price T seqi ; this is
bounded by the expected revenue of the optimal mechanism for selling a single item.
3.2 Near optimal simultaneous sale
In our construction, we use the ex-ante relaxation (EAR) [3, 4] for selling a private good.
The EAR relaxes the feasibility constraint, so that instead of selling at most one item
ex post, this constraint holds only in expectation. Since the feasible region increases, the
revenue of an optimal mechanism for this case can only be higher than Myerson’s optimal
mechanism. Combined with Lemma 3.4, it suffices to provide a pricing scheme for our setting
that approximates the revenue of the EAR. As it turns out, when agents’ values are drawn
from regular distributions, the optimal mechanism for the ex-ante setting is a posted price
mechanism. These prices can be computed in polynomial time by a convex programming
formulation [14].
We use these prices to determine prices for the sale of public goods. To do so, we partition
the agents into valuable and non-valuable agents, based on their contribution to the revenue
of the EAR. All the revenue obtained in our pricing scheme comes from the valuable agents.
Their prices are set so that if there exists a valuable agent that buys with low probability,
then the equilibrium condition guarantees that the other agents buy with a sufficiently high
probability.
I Theorem 3.5. For social goods with full externalities and for any regular product distribution
F , there exists a poly-time algorithm that computes prices p for which Rsim(F ,p) ≥
R∗sim(F)/5.83.
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Proof: Let pˆ = (pˆ1, . . . , pˆn) be the posted prices that maximize the revenue in the EAR,
and let R = ∑i pˆi(1 − Fi(pˆi)) be the optimal revenue of the EAR. As mentioned above,
R ≥Myer(F). Let c1, c2 > 1 be two parameters, to be determined later. We partition the
agents into two groups as follows. Let B = {i ∈ [n] : pˆi ≥ R/c1} and S = [n] \B. For every
agent i we set
pi =
{
pˆi/c2 i ∈ B
∞ i ∈ S .
The revenue from the agents in S in the optimal EAR mechanism is bounded by
∑
i∈S pˆi ·
Pr [i buys] ≤ Rc1
∑
i∈S(1− Fi(pˆi)) ≤ Rc1 , where the last inequality stems from the fact that
the EAR sells at most 1 item in expectation. Therefore, the revenue extracted from agents
in B in the EAR is∑
i∈B
pˆi · (1− Fi(pˆi)) ≥ R− R
c1
= (1− 1/c1)R. (9)
Let T be an equilibrium induced by the price vector p = (p1, . . . , pn). We consider two cases:
Case 1: Ti ≤ pˆi for every i ∈ B. In this case,
Rsim(F ,p,T) =
∑
i
pi · (1− Fi(Ti)) =
∑
i∈B
pi · (1− Fi(Ti))
≥
∑
i∈B
pˆi
c2
· (1− Fi(pˆi))
(9)
≥
(
1− 1/c1
c2
)
R,
where the first inequality follows from case 1 and the monotonicity of Fi.
Case 2: There exists i ∈ B such that Ti > pˆi. For such an agent i,
pˆi/c2∏
j 6=i Fj(Tj)
= pi∏
j 6=i Fj(Tj)
(5)= Ti > pˆi ⇒
∏
j
Fj(Tj) ≤
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj) ≤ 1
c2
. (10)
Let pmin = mini pi. The expected revenue in this case is at least
pmin · Pr[at least one agent buys] ≥ R
c1c2
(
1−
∏
j
Fj(Tj)
) (10)
≥
(
1− 1/c2
c1c2
)
R,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that all prices are at least Rc1c2 .
Therefore, we get an approximation factor of min
{(
1−1/c1
c2
)
,
(
1−1/c2
c1c2
)}
. Setting c1 =
√
2
and c2 = 1 + 1√2 optimizes the approximation ratio and gives revenue of at least a
1
3+2
√
2
fraction of R. Since R ≥Myer(F) ≥ R∗sim(F) (by Lemma 3.4), we get that Rsim(F ,p) ≥R∗sim(F)
3+2
√
2 ≈
R∗sim(F)
5.83 .
Remark: An approximation ratio of 8 is given in [10] for the special case of i.i.d. distributions.
The last theorem improves the approximation ratio to 5.83 even for the more general case of
non-identical distributions. Moreover, in Appendix B we give a non-discriminatory pricing
that gives 4 approximation for the case of identical distributions. We also show that no
pricing scheme can give better approximation than 4/e, even for identical distributions.
3.3 Near optimal sequential sale
In this section, we devise a posted price mechanism that approximates the optimal revenue,
given a regular product distribution F and the order of arrival of the agents σ. The
celebrated prophet inequalities [17] implies that when selling a single private good, one
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can find posted prices that achieve an expected revenue of at least half of the optimal
mechanism. The posted prices are computed as follows. Let φi(v) = v − 1−Fi(v)fi(v) be the
virtual value function of agent i10. Let t be such that Prv∼F [maxi φi(vi) > t] = 1/2, and set
pPIi = φ−1i (t) to be the posted price for agent i. By the monotonicity of virtual values in
regular distributions, we have that the item is sold with probability of exactly 1/2, meaning
that Pr [item is not sold] =
∏
i Fi(pPIi ) = 1/2. Assuming that agents arrive according
to their index, the result of [17] implies that the expected revenue from posting prices
pPI = (pPI1 , . . . , pPIn ) is∑
i
Pr[i is offered] · pPIi · (1− Fi(pPIi )) =
∑
i
pPIi · (1− Fi(pPIi )) ·
∏
j<i
Fj(pPIj )
≥ Myer(F)/2, (11)
where the equality follows since agent i is offered if and only if no agent arriving before agent
i buys the good. We now show that by setting prices that induce thresholds equal to the
prophet inequalities prices, the seller obtains a 4 approximation to the optimal revenue.
I Theorem 3.6. For goods with full externalities, any regular product distribution F and
any known arrival order of the agents σ, there exists a poly-time algorithm for computing
prices p for which Rseq(F , σ,p) ≥ R∗seq(F)/4.
Proof: As before, let t be such that Prv∼F [maxi φi(vi) > t] = 1/2. We want to set
thresholds such that for every i, Ti = φ−1i (t) = pPIi . Therefore, agent i buys if and only if no
agent j < i purchased the item, and the virtual value of agent i is greater than t. According
to Observation 3.1, knowing the order of arrival, one can find a price vector that supports
these thresholds using Eq. (7) (and this price vector is unique). Let p = T−1F (T) be that
vector. Notice that setting the thresholds as described above yields that
∏
i∈[n] Fi(Ti) = 1/2.
As shown in Eq. (8), the expected revenue obtained by setting the price vector p (which
supports these thresholds) is:
Rseq(F ,p,T) =
n∑
i=1
Ti · (1− Fi(Ti)) ·
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
=
n∑
i=1
Ti · (1− Fi(Ti)) ·
∏
j<i
Fj(Tj) ·
∏
j>i
Fj(Tj). (12)
Since φi(Ti) = t for every i and for a virtual value t that satisfies the conditions for the
prophet inequality, we have that
n∑
i=1
Ti · (1− Fi(Ti)) ·
∏
j<i
Fj(Tj) =
n∑
i=1
pPIi · (1− Fi(pPIi )) ·
∏
j<i
Fj(pPIj )
(11)
≥ Myer(F)/2. (13)
We conclude:
Rseq(F ,p,T) (12)=
n∑
i=1
Ti · (1− Fi(Ti)) ·
∏
j<i
Fj(Tj) ·
∏
j>i
Fj(Tj)
≥
n∑
i=1
Ti · (1− Fi(Ti)) ·
∏
j<i
Fj(Tj)/2
(13)
≥ Myer(F)/4
(Lemma 3.4)
≥ R∗seq(F)/4,
where the first inequality follows from
∏
i∈[n] Fi(Ti) = 1/2.
10 See Appendix A for an overview of the optimal mechanism design theory we refer to.
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3.4 Non-discriminatory prices
We now show how to approximate the optimal expected revenue of a seller by offering a
single, non-discriminatory price, both for the worst case equilibrium in the simultaneous
model and for any order of arrival of agents in the sequential model. In the context of selling
a single private good, an anonymous posted price mechanism posts a single price p,
and the first agent to arrive who is willing to pay p obtains the item at price p. This is a
sequential posted price mechanism that posts the same price p for every agent. We show that
a seller that offers an item to every agent at price p/2 obtains at least 1/4 of the revenue
obtained in the case of an anonymous sale of a single private item at price p. This holds
both in the simultaneous and the sequential cases.
I Theorem 3.7. Let R = p · (1−∏i Fi(p)) be the revenue of an anonymous price mechanism
for the sale of a single private good which posts a price p. For a price vector p′ =
(
p
2 , . . . ,
p
2
)
,
we have:
(i) Rsim(F ,p′) ≥ R/4.
(ii) For every σ, Rseq(F , σ,p′,TF (σ,p′)) ≥ R/4.
Proof: First, given an equilibrium strategy vector T, we have that the revenue in the
sequential model, for every arrival order is exactly p2 ·(1−
∏
i Fi(Ti)), while in the simultaneous
model, the revenue is at least p2 · (1−
∏
i Fi(Ti)), since more than one agent might purchase
an item. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.5, we consider two cases:
1. Ti ≤ p for every agent i: In this case, since the CDFs are monotonically non-decreasing,
we have that p2 · (1−
∏
i Fi(Ti)) ≥ p2 · (1−
∏
i Fi(p)) = R/2.
2. There exists an agent i such that Ti > p: In the simultaneous case, by the equilibrium
condition (4), we have that Ti = p/2∏
j 6=i Fj(Tj)
> p. This implies that
∏
j Fj(Tj) < 12 . In
the sequential case, for any arrival order σ, by the equilibrium condition (7), we have
that Ti = p/2∏
j:σ(j)>σ(i)
Fj(Tj)
> p, which implies that
∏
j Fj(Tj) ≤
∏
j:σ(j)>σ(i)
Fj(Tj) < 12 . In
both cases, we get that p2 · (1−
∏
i Fi(Ti)) ≥ p/4. Since R = p · (1−
∏
i Fi(p)) ≤ p, we
get the desired result.
Applying the e-approximation anonymous posted price mechanism presented in [4], we
get:
I Corollary 3.8. For goods with full externalities and for any product distribution F , there
exists a poly-time algorithm for computing a non-discriminatory price p such that:
(i) Rsim(F ,p = 〈p, . . . , p〉) ≥ R∗sim(F)/4e; and
(ii) For every order σ, Rseq(F , σ,p,TF (σ,p)) ≥ R∗seq(F)/4e.
4 Pricing goods with status-based externalities
Recall that in this setting, every agent is associated with a discount factor wi ∈ [0, 1], Let
w = (w1, . . . , wn). We next present near-optimal simultaneous and sequential sales.
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4.1 Near optimal sequential sale
We devise a non-adaptive pricing scheme (i.e., where an agent’s price does not depend on the
previous purchases) that approximates the revenue of the optimal adaptive pricing scheme.11
In our scheme, every agent is assigned with a single price.
Let p0 and p>0 be the price vectors posted by the seller who uses two price vectors,
where p0i (resp., p>0i ) is the price offered to agent i when no agent (resp., at least one agent)
has purchased a good prior to i’s arrival. Let p = (p0,p>0). The next theorem, proved in
Appendix C, establishes that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to two price
vectors.
I Theorem 4.1. Let pˆ = (pˆ1, . . . , pˆn) be a posted-price mechanism where pˆi : 2[i−1] → R≥0.
For every pˆ there exists a simple mechanism, described by two vectors p = (p0,p>0), for
which R(p) ≥ R(pˆ).
In contrast to the full externalities settings, agent i may have two different thresholds in the
equilibrium — one for the case where no agent bought a good before she arrives, denoted by
T 0i , and one for the case where at least one agent buys the good, denoted by T>0i . For every
agent i, if some agent bought the good before she arrived, she faces the following trade-off —
if she buys the good, her utility is vi − p>0i ; otherwise, her utility is wi · vi. Therefore, the
threshold satisfies the following equation:
T>0i − p>0i = wi · T>0i ⇒ p>0i = (1− wi) · T>0i . (14)
If no agent bought the good before before agent i arrived, then12
T 0i − p0i = wi · T 0i · Pr[Agent j > i buys a good] = wi · T 0i ·
(
1−
∏
j>i
Fj(T 0j )
)
⇒ p0i = (1− wi) · T 0i + wi · T 0i ·
∏
j>i
Fj(T 0j ). (15)
For every agent i and pricing p = (p0,p>0), let q0i = q0i (p) (resp., q>0i = q>0i (p)) denote
the probability that no agent (resp., at least one agent) has bought a good before agent i
arrived. The revenue can now be written as
R(p) =
∑
i
(
q0i · p0i · (1− Fi(T 0i )) + q>0i · p>0i · (1− Fi(T>0i ))
)
(15)=
∑
i
q0i ·
(
(1− wi) · T 0i + wi · T 0i ·
∏
j>i
Fj(T 0j )
)
· (1− Fi(T 0i )) +
∑
i
q>0i · p>0i · (1− Fi(T>0i ))
(14)=
∑
i
q0i · (1− wi) · T 0i · (1− Fi(T 0i )) +
∑
i
q0i · wi · T 0i ·
(∏
j>i
Fj(T 0j )
)
· (1− Fi(T 0i ))
+
∑
i
q>0i · T>0i · (1− wi) · (1− Fi(T>0i )).
By removing some occurrences of factors smaller than 1 (q0i , q>0i , wi) in the last expression,
11Which sets a price for the current agent depending on the set of agents that purchased the good prior
her arrival.
12For the case of i = n, the RHS product is naturally defined to be 1, and therefore T 0n = p0n.
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany
we get
R(p) ≤
∑
i
(1− wi) · T 0i · (1− Fi(T 0i )) +
∑
i
(∏
j<i
Fj(T 0j )
)
· T 0i ·
(∏
j>i
Fj(T 0j )
)
· (1− Fi(T 0i ))
+
∑
i
T>0i · (1− wi) · (1− Fi(T>0i ))
=
∑
i
(1− wi) · T 0i · (1− Fi(T 0i )) +
∑
i
(1− wi) · T>0i · (1− Fi(T>0i ))
+
∑
i
T 0i ·
(∏
j 6=i
Fj(T 0j )
)
· (1− Fi(T 0i )). (16)
Given a thresholds vector T = (T1, T2, . . . , Tn), we define R1(T,w) =
∑
i(1− wi) · Ti ·
(1− Fi(Ti)) and R2(T) =
∑
i Ti ·
(∏
j 6=i Fj(Tj)
)
· (1− Fi(Ti)). It follows from Eq. (16) that
max
p
R(p) ≤ 2 max
T
R1(T,w) + maxT R2(T). (17)
That is, the RHS sum in Eq. (17) is an upper bound on the optimal revenue that can be
obtained. R1(T,w) can be viewed as the private component of the revenue, which becomes
more significant as wi’s get smaller, while R2(T) can be viewed as the public component,
which becomes more significant as wi’s grow. Notice that maxTR2(T) is exactly R∗seq(F),
where R∗seq(F) is the optimal posted prices revenue in a sequential sale in the full externalities
model, as defined in Section 3.
We now show that it is possible to find prices that approximate maxTR1(T,w) and prices
that approximate maxTR2(T). In fact, we show a stronger result, namely that for each of
the terms in the sum, there exists a single price vector p = p0 = p>0 that approximates it.
This is shown in Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 whose proofs are deferred to Appendix C.
I Lemma 4.2. There exists a poly-time algorithm for computing prices p such that R(p) ≥
maxTR1(T,w).
Recall that Rseq(F ,p′) is the expected revenue from posting price vector p′ to agents
that arrive sequentially in the full externalities model. The following allows us to reduce the
problem of finding “good" prices in the status-based externalities model to finding “good"
prices in the full externalities model.
I Lemma 4.3. Given prices p′, there exist poly-time computable prices p such that R(p) ≥
Rseq(F ,p′).
We now present the main result of this section:
I Theorem 4.4. Given a c-approximation pricing for sequential sales in the full externalities
model, there exists a poly-time computable pricing that guarantees a (c+ 2)-approximation
for the optimal sequential sales in the model of status-based externalities.
Proof: Since maxTR2(T) = R∗seq(F), if one can find prices that c-approximate the
optimal prices in the full externalities model, by Lemma 4.3, one can compute prices that
c-approximate maxTR2(T) in the status-based externalities model.
Let p1 and p2 be the sets of prices for which R(p1) ≥ maxTR1(T,w) and c · R(p2) ≥
maxTR2(T), respectively. These prices can be computed in poly time by Lemmas 4.2 and
4.3. We have that
max
p
R(p)
(17)
≤ 2 max
T
R1(T,w) + maxT R2(T)
≤ 2 · R(p1) + c · R(p2)
≤ (c+ 2) ·max{R(p1),R(p2)}.
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany
The following corollary directly follows from Theorems 4.4 and 3.6.
I Corollary 4.5. For goods that exhibit status-based externalities, there exists a poly-time
algorithm for computing prices that give a 6-approximation to the optimal pricing scheme.
We note that unlike in the full externalities scenario, price discrimination is needed. This
is since the revenue obtained by using non-discriminatory prices can be smaller by a factor
of Θ(logn) than the optimal revenue, as shown in Appendix G.
4.2 Near optimal simultaneous sale
Given an equilibrium threshold vector T = (T1, . . . , Tn), the expected value agent i derives
from other agents is ES∼µ−iT [xi(S)] = wi·Pr [some agent j 6= i buys] = wi
(
1−∏j 6=i Fj(Tj)) .
Plugging this expression into Eq. (4) we get that in equilibrium, for every i
pi = (1− wi) · Ti + wi · Ti ·
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj). (18)
Our main result of this section is:
I Theorem 4.6. For goods that exhibit status-based externalities, there exists a poly-time
algorithm for computing prices for a simultaneous sale that approximate the optimal posted
prices sale to within a constant factor at any equilibrium.
In order to prove Theorem 4.6, we show that the revenue, R(p,T), that is obtained by
prices p at equilibrium T is upper bounded by R1(T,w) +R2(T), where R1 and R2 are
as defined in Section 4.1. We then show how to devise prices that obtain a constant factor
approximation to maxTˆR1(Tˆ,w) at any equilibrium, and prices that obtain a constant factor
approximation to maxTˆR2(Tˆ) at any equilibrium. Ergo, we devise prices that approximate
the better of the two, which in turn, give a constant factor approximation to the optimal
attainable revenue. The full details of the proof of Theorem 4.6 are given in Appendix D.
5 Pricing goods with availability-based externalities
Recall that in this scenario, the fraction agent i gets when a set S 63 i purchases the good is
w(|S|) for a non-decreasing function w : [n]→ [0, 1]. For ease of notation, we use wk = w(k)
and normalize wn = 1 and w0 = 0. For each agent i, the seller sets a vector of prices
pi = (p0i , . . . , pi−1i ), where p
j
i is the price that the seller sets for agent i if j agents bought
a good prior to her arrival; let p be the price matrix (p1, . . . , pn). Our benchmark is the
optimal revenue obtained by any posted price matrix p.
Our main result of this section, is the following:
I Theorem 5.1. For goods that exhibit availability-based externalities, there exists a poly-time
algorithm for computing a price matrix p for sequential sale that approximates the optimal
sale using a price matrix to within an O(logn) factor.
We first describe the equilibrium obtained by the agents when the seller posts a matrix
p. For every agent i, we define a set of thresholds T 0i , . . . , T i−1i , where T
j
i (p) is the minimal
value for which agent i buys the good conditioned on j agents buying the good prior to her
arrival given the price matrix p. We use the following notations:
1. qi,j(p): the probability that j agents buy a good prior to agent i’s arrival, given prices p.
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2. rki,j(p): the probability that exactly k agents buy a good given prices p and given that j
agents bought a good prior to agent i’s arrival. For ease of notations, we define rjn+1,j = 1
and rkn+1,j = 0 for every j 6= k.
3. r<ki,j (p) =
∑k−1
`=j r
`
i,j : the probability that strictly less than k agents buy a good overall
given prices p and given that j agents bought a good prior to i’s arrival.
When clear from the context, we omit p and simply write T ji , qi,j , rki,j and r<ki,j . Given these
notations, we now describe the equilibrium condition for agent i. If agent i buys a good
when j agents buy a good prior to her arrival, her utility from buying a good at price pji
is vi − pji . On the other hand, if the agent does not buy a good, her expected utility is
vi ·
∑
`≥j w` · r`i+1,j . Therefore, the threshold from which it is better for agent i to buy an
item when j agents bought an item prior to agent i satisfies:
T ji − pji = T ji ·
∑
`≥j
w` · r`i+1,j ⇒ pji = T ji (1−
∑
`≥j
w` · r`i+1,j)
Clearly, if j agents bought the good prior to agent i’s arrival, then for every ` < j, r`i+1,j = 0.
Therefore, we can rewrite the above condition as follows:
pji = T
j
i (1−
∑
`≥j
w` · r`i+1,j) = T ji (wn ·
∑
`≥j
r`i+1,j −
∑
`≥j
w` · r`i+1,j)
= T ji ·
∑
`≥j
r`i+1,j(wn − w`) = T ji ·
∑
`≥j
r`i+1,j ·
∑
k>`
(wk − wk−1)
= T ji ·
∑
k>j
(wk − wk−1) ·
k−1∑
`=0
r`i+1,j = T
j
i ·
∑
k>j
(wk − wk−1) · r<ki+1,j , (19)
where the second equality stems from wn = 1 and
∑
`≥j r
`
i+1,j = 1.
Notice that for j ≥ i, qi,j = 0. We therefore can express the revenue from setting prices
p as:
R(p) =
∑
i,j
qi,j · pji · (1− Fi(T ji ))
=
∑
i,j
qi,j · T ji ·
∑
k>j
(wk − wk−1) · r<ki+1,j · (1− Fi(T ji ))
=
n∑
k=1
(wk − wk−1) ·
∑
i
∑
j<k
qi,j · T ji · (1− Fi(T ji )) · r<ki+1,j . (20)
For a given vector of thresholds T and a given k, let
Rk(T) =
∑
i
∑
j<k
qi,j · T ji · (1− Fi(T ji )) · r<ki+1,j .
In order to bound the revenue in Eq. (20), we draw a connection between Rk(T) and the
sale of k identical items without externalities. As we define in Appendix A, let R(F ,Uk, σ,p)
be the revenue of a posted price mechanism for agents drawn from a product distribution F ,
and offered prices p sequentially, according to order σ, until k items are sold in a setting
with no externalities (Uk is the k-uniform matroid feasibility constraint). Since we assume
that agents arrive according to their index, we omit σ from now on. We denote by R∗(F ,Uk)
the revenue of the optimal posted price mechanism for selling k private items sequentially in
the same order of arrival as in our social goods setting. We establish the following lemma:
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I Lemma 5.2. For every threshold vector T and every number of items k,
Rk(T) ≤ R∗(F ,Uk).
Proof: Let us define the following posted prices sale for selling k items privately. We define
the price matrix pˆ, where
pˆji =
{
T ji j < k
∞ otherwise .
When agent i arrives, the seller posts a price of pˆji if j goods where purchased prior to agent
i’s arrival.
For j < k, let qˆi,j be the probability that j items are sold prior agent i’s arrival. We show
by induction on i that for every i and j qˆi,j = qi,j . For the first agent to arrive (i.e., i = 1),
clearly qi,0 = qˆi,0 = 1 (and obviously, qi,j = qˆi,j = 0 for every other j). Let us assume that
the claim holds for agent i (and for every j). It is clear that for j < k,
qi+1,j = qi,j−1 · (1− Fi(T j−1i )) + qi,j · Fi(T ji ) = qˆi,j−1 · (1− Fi(pˆj−1i )) + qˆi,j · Fi(pˆji ) = qˆi+1,j .
Therefore, the revenue from selling k items in a private sale using prices pˆ can be expressed
by:∑
i
∑
j<k
qˆi,j · pˆji · (1− Fi(pˆji )) =
∑
i
∑
j<k
qi,j · T ji · (1− Fi(T ji ))
≥
∑
i
∑
j<k
qi,j · T ji · (1− Fi(T ji )) · r<ki+1,j
= Rk(T).
Since selling k items using prices pˆ is a private posted price sale of at most k items, the
revenue obtained by this sale is at most that of the optimal posted price sale for selling k
items, R∗(F ,Uk). Therefore, we get the desired result.
For k > n, we set wk = 1. Using Lemma 5.2, we can bound Eq. (20) and get
R(p) ≤
n∑
k=1
(wk − wk−1) · R∗(F ,Uk)
=
blognc∑
`=0
2`+1−1∑
k=2`
(wk − wk−1) · R∗(F ,Uk)
≤
blognc∑
`=0
2`+1−1∑
k=2`
(wk − wk−1) · R∗
(F ,Umin(2`+1−1,n))
=
blognc∑
`=0
(w2`+1−1 − w2`−1) · R∗
(F ,Umin(2`+1−1,n)) ,
where the second equality stems from (wk − wk−1) · R∗(F ,Uk) = (1− 1) · R∗(F ,Uk) = 0 for
k > n.
In order to show an O(logn) approximation to the optimal sequential posted price sell,
we show how to produce a sale of revenue Ω(1) · (w2k+1−wk) · R∗(F ,U2k+1) for every k ≤ n.
This is given in the two following lemmas, whose proofs are deferred to Appendix E.
I Lemma 5.3. For every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exist prices p that guarantee an expected
revenue of Ω(1) · (w2k+1 − wk) · R∗(F ,U2k+1).
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I Lemma 5.4. There exist prices p that guarantee an expected revenue of Ω(1) · R∗(F ,U1).
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows by combining the upper bound on the optimal revenue
in Eq. (28) and the approximation guarantees from Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4.
6 Hardness results for network-based externalities
In this section we show that unless P = NP, for network-based externalities and for every
 > 0, we cannot output a price vector for which the revenue is an O(n1−)-approximation to
the optimal revenue. This is true in the simultaneous model, even when all agents’ valuations
are drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. In the sequential model, this is true
even when agents all have a fixed value 1. Recall that in the network-based externalities
model, externalities are modeled by a graph, and agent derives her entire value if she or one
of her neighbors by the good; that is, xi(S) = 1 if and only if S ∩ {i∪N(i)} 6= ∅, where N(i)
denotes the neighbors of i in the graph. In order to show our hardness result, we use the
following hardness result obtained by Zuckerman:
I Theorem 6.1. [21] For all  > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate the size of the maximal
independent set in a graph to within a factor of O(n1−).
We first prove the hardness result for the simultaneous model:
I Theorem 6.2. Assume that all agents’ valuations are drawn i.i.d. from the uniform
distribution over [0, 1]. Given a (undirected) graph G with n nodes, it is NP-hard to compute
prices which approximate the optimal revenue when agents arrive simultaneously to within a
factor of O(n1−).
Proof: Let k be the size of the maximum independent set in G = (V = [n], E). We reduce
the problem of approximating the size of the maximal independent set in G to the problem
of maximizing revenue for agents in [n] who exhibit network-based externalities based on the
graph G. We first describe the equilibrium condition. Given agents’ strategies T, we have that
ES∼µ−iT [xi(S)] = 1 −
∏
j∈N(i) Fj(Tj). Therefore, Eq. (4) becomes pi = Ti ·
∏
j∈N(i) Fj(Tj)
for every i.
We show that by computing prices p for which Rsim(F ,p) approximates R∗sim(F) =
maxp∗ Rsim(F ,p) to within a factor of O(n1−), we can approximate the size of the inde-
pendent set in G to within a factor O(n1−) as well, which is NP-hard according to Theorem
6.1. We note that R∗sim(F) ≤ R∗sim(F), which implies we cannot approximate R∗sim(F) as
well.
By fixing a maximum size independent set S, and offering a price of 1/2 to each agent i
in S and ∞ to all agents not in S, we get a revenue of 1/4 from agent i for every agent in S.
This is true since none of agent i’s neighbors purchase a good, and therefore Ti = pi = 1/2.
Therefore, we get that R∗sim(F) ≥ k/4.
We now show the reduction. We are given an algorithm that takes the graph as input
and computes a price vector p satisfying Rsim(p) ≥ R∗sim(F)/Θ(n1−) for some constant
 > 0. We compute an equilibrium using the following:
We show that for every agent i, Ti is the best-response. We distinguish between two
cases:
1. i ∈ S: it is clear that for every j ∈ N(i), Fj(Tj) = 1 and therefore Ti = pi∏
j∈N(i) Fj(Tj)
= pi.
2. i /∈ S: there exists k < i such that k ∈ N(i) ∩ S and therefore
Ti =
pi∏
j∈N(i) Fj(Tj)
≥ pk
Fk(Tk)
= pk
Fk(pk)
= 1,
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Assume by renaming that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pn.
S ← ∅
For i = 1, . . . , n:
If N(i) ∩ S = ∅:
S = S ∪ {i}
Ti = pi
Else:
Ti = 1
which is equivalent to having a threshold Ti = 1.
Notice that in the equilibrium computed, the set S is an independent set. This follows since
in each step we check whether adding i into S preserve that S is still an independent set.
Therefore, Rsim(F ,p,T) ≤ k. We output |MAX−IS| = Rsim(F ,p,T) =
∑
i pi ·(1−Fi(Ti)).
If the algorithm finds prices such that Rsim(F ,p) ≥ R
∗
sim(F)
O(n1−) , we get we computed a number
in
[
k
O(n1−) , k
]
, which is NP-hard according to Theorem 6.1.
The following theorem shows that it is hard for the seller to compute prices that maximize
the seller’s revenue, even in the case where all agents’ valuations are known to be equal to 1.
I Theorem 6.3. Assume that all agents’ have a fixed value of 1 and that tie-breaking is
done-consistently. Given a graph G with n nodes, it is NP-hard to compute prices which
approximate the optimal revenue when agents arrive sequentially to within a factor of
O(n1−).
Proof: Let k be the size of the maximum independent set in G. By fixing a maximum
size independent set, and offering a price of 1/2 to each agent i in the set, we get a revenue
of 1/2 from agent i (and a price > 1 for all other agents). This is true since none of agent
i’s neighbors purchase a good. Therefore, we get that R∗seq(F) ≥ k/2. Since we assume
tie-breaking is done consistently, we can assume that vi 6= pi for every i. We now show how
to compute an equilibrium:
S ← ∅
For i = n, . . . , 1:
If (pi < vi) and N(i) ∩ S = ∅:
S = S ∪ {i}
We claim that in a subgame perfect equilibrium, only agents in S buy a good. We show it
by induction on the number of agents. For n = 1, this is trivial, since the single agent buys
if and only if pi < vi. Let us assume the claim is true for n < n′, and show the claim for
n = n′. Let us inspect the first agent to arrive. We inspect two cases:
1. The first agent does not buy a good (i.e., the first agent is not in S): this implies one of
the following.
v1 < p1. In this case the agent has a negative utility of purchasing the good and he
would not buy.
A neighboring agent purchases a good and the first agent has a utility of v1, which is
greater than v1 − p1, the utility of the agent if she were to purchase a good. After the
first agent does not buy a good, this is equivalent to a network without the first agent,
and by the inductive assumption, the rest of the players are in a subgame perfect
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equilibrium. This is, one of the neighbors of the first agent buys a good. Therefore,
the first agent gets a higher utility in the subgame perfect equilibrium induced by the
agent not buying a good.
We get that in this case, the first agent does not buy in an equilibrium. Since this is
equivalent to a network without the first agent, by the inductive assumption, the rest of
the players are in a subgame perfect equilibrium when set S is the purchasing set.
2. The first agent buys a good (the first agent is in S). This implies that v1 > p1 and that
non of the agent’s neighbors is in S (N(1) ∩ S = ∅). Therefore, if the first agent buys a
good, her utility is v1 − p1 > 0. If the first agent were not to buy a good, this would have
been equivalent to a network without the first agent. By the inductive assumption, in
an equilibrium, the set S − {1} would have bought a good. Therefore, non of agent 1’s
neighbors would have bought a good, and her utility would have been 0. This implies
that in equilibrium, the first agent buys.
Whenever the first agent buys a good, her neighbors do not buy a good, and this is
equivalent to a network without the first agent and the agents in N(1). It is not hard to
verify that in this case, the computation above returns the set S − {1} as a purchasing
set. This follows since the non-purchasing agents have no effect on the agents that arrive
prior to them or after them in the computation. That is, the set S buys overall in the
equilibrium where the first agent buys.
We get that in both cases, the subgame perfect equilibrium is for agents in set S to purchase
a good, which completes the inductive proof.
Notice that in the equilibrium computed above, the set S of purchasing agents is an inde-
pendent set, and therefore,
∑
i∈S pi ≤ |S| ≤ k. Our reduction from maximum independent
set computes S and returns |MAX− IS| = ∑i∈S pi. We conclude that if the algorithm finds
prices such that Rseq(F ,p) ≥ R
∗
seq(F)
O(n1−) , we can compute a number in
[
k
O(n1−) , k
]
, which is
NP-hard according to Theorem 6.1.
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A Brief overview on single parameter environments without
externalities
Selling a private good. We draw interesting connections between the posted price
mechanism for selling social goods and the nearly optimal mechanism for selling a single
good in a setting with no externalities. We denote this as “selling a private good" or as the
“private model." Next, we give a brief overview of some of the main concepts in this field.
I Definition A.1 (Virtual values and Regularity). Let F be the cumulative distribution function
of an atomless distribution, and let f be its corresponding density function. The virtual
value function associated with F is defined as φ(v) = v − 1−F (v)f(v) . The distribution F is
regular if its corresponding φ is non-decreasing.
In a seminal paper of [19], Myerson showed that the mechanism that obtains optimal revenue
from selling a private good is a virtual value maximizer; i.e., it sells the good to the agent
with the highest virtual value as long as her virtual value is non-negative. Note that given a
product distribution from which agent valuations are drawn, the optimal mechanism induces
for every agent a probability for getting served, and the sum of probabilities is no greater
than 1.
Ex ante relaxation. To achieve good upper bounds in the private model, a useful method
is to consider the ex-ante relaxation[3, 4]. In the private model, if a good is given to one
agent, it cannot be assigned to another one. In the ex-ante relaxation, a good can be assigned
to more than one agent, as long as the expected number of agents assigned is at most one.
Clearly, the revenue of such a mechanism is an upper bound of the optimal mechanism that
satisfies this condition ex post (e.g., Myerson’s optimal mechanism). For regular distributions,
the optimal ex-ante mechanism turns out to be a simple posted price mechanism and can be
efficiently computed using a convex programming formulation.
Monopoly price. Given a single agent whose valuation is drawn from a regular distribution
F , the Monopoly Price is the posted price p∗ that maximizes the expected revenue extracted
from the agent, p∗ = argmaxpp·(1−F (p)). Let φ be the virtual value function for distribution
F . The monopoly price satisfies φ(p∗) = 0.
Anonymous price mechanism. Such a mechanism is defined in the context of selling
a single private good. An anonymous posted price mechanism posts a single price p,
and the first agent to arrive who is willing to pay p obtains the item at price p. This is a
sequential posted price mechanism that posts the same price p for every agent. In [4], the
authors showed the following:
I Theorem A.1. [4] For any regular product distribution F , there exists an anonymous price
p such that p · (1 −∏i Fi(p)) ≥ Myer(F)/e. Furthermore, this price can be computed in
polynomial time.13
Multi-item settings. Myerson’s optimal mechanism naturally extends to a setting where
multiple identical private goods are for sale, and each agent wants a single good (unit-demand
settings); simply maximize the sum of virtual values of the agents served and charge them
13This polynomial time computation was not explicitly shown in [4]. One of the prices offered by the
optimal ex-ante mechanism is an anonymous price that achieves an e-approximation, as clarified in a
personal communication with Emmanouil Pountourakis.
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according to Myerson’s payment identity [19]. Chawla et al. [8] showed how to design a
posted price mechanism that approximates the revenue of the optimal Myerson mechanism.
Sequential posted price mechanisms. Gaining popularity, posted price mechanisms
approximate the revenue obtained by optimal mechanisms for a wide variety of settings using
a surprisingly simple auction structure; Simply offer a take it or leave it price for agents in a
sequential order under a predetermined feasibility constraint. Chawla et al. [8] distinguished
between two types of mechanisms. Sequential posted price mechanism (SPM) in which the
seller can choose the order in which the agents are offered the prices, and Oblivious posted
price mechanisms (OPMs) in which the agents’ order of arrival is fixed in advanced and
known to the seller. As we note above, they showed how to approximate the optimal revenue
of Myerson’s optimal auction using an OPM when selling k identical items under a k-uniform
matroid feasibility constraint.
Nearly optimal OPM for multi-item settings. One of the settings addressed by [8] is
the multi-item setting, where k items are sold using an OPM, and the feasibility constraint
is a k-uniform matroid (meaning that every set of size at most k can be served), denoted by
Uk. Let R(F ,Uk, σ,p) denote the revenue of an OPM using pricing p when agents arrive
according to σ with valuations drawn from F under feasibility constraint Uk. [8] showed the
following:
I Theorem A.2. [8] For any regular product distribution F and for any order σ, there exists a
polytime algorithm for computing prices p such that R(F ,Uk, σ,p) ≥Myer(F ,Uk)/2, where
Myer(F ,Uk) denotes the revenue of the Myerson optimal mechanism given the product
distribution F and the feasibility constraint Uk.
B 4/e lower bound and 4 upper bound for simultaneous sale of public
goods for i.i.d. agents
We first show that there exists a set of distributions F for which no (possibly non-discriminatory)
pricing achieves more than e/4 fraction of the optimal attainable revenue R∗sim(F) at the
worst equilibrium.
I Theorem B.1. There exists a product of identical regular distributions F such that for
every p, Rsim(F ,p) ≤ R∗sim(F) · e/4.
Proof: We set F to be the product of identical distributions, where every Fi is uniform over
[0, 1]. Given a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pn), the following yields an equilibrium. Assume
by renaming that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pn, and assume p1 ≤ 1 (otherwise, no agent buys). By
setting T1 = p1 and {Ti = pi/p1 ≥ 1}i>1, we have that F1(T1) = p1 and for every i > 1
Fi(Ti) = 1. Therefore, T1 ·
∏
i>1 Fi(Ti) = p1 and Ti ·
∏
j 6=i Fj(Tj) =
pi
p1
· p1 = pi for i > 1,
and the equilibrium condition (5) holds. In this equilibrium, no agent i > 1 buys. Thus,
agent 1 cannot rely on others, and buys the good if and only if v1 > p1. In order to maximize
the seller’s revenue at this equilibrium, we set p1 = 1/2 (the monopoly price), which leads to
Rsim(F ,p) ≤ 1/4 (21)
for every p.
Now consider a seller that sets a non-discriminatory price p =
(
1− 1n+1
)n
and the
symmetric equilibrium Ti =
(
1− 1n+1
)
for every i. It is easy to verify that the equilibrium
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condition (5) holds. We get that the revenue in this equilibrium is
∑
i
p · (1− Fi(Ti)) = n ·
(
1− 1
n+ 1
)n
· 1
n+ 1 =
(
1− 1
n+ 1
)n+1
≈ 1/e ≤ R∗sim(F). (22)
Combining (21) with (22) yields the desired result.
In the following, we describe a non-discriminatory pricing that gives a 4-approximation to
the optimal revenue for the case where agents’ valuations are drawn i.i.d.. This is achieved
using a simple adaptation of the technique used in the proof of Theorem 3.5. We note that
this is a factor 2 improvement over the main result in [10].
I Theorem B.2. For every product of identical regular distributions F there exists an
algorithm for computing a non-discriminatory pricing p, such that Rsim(F ,p) ≥ R∗sim(F)/4.
Proof: Our starting point is the prices maximizing the ex-ante relaxation revenue for F .
Since the distributions are identical, the prices are identical, and we denote them by pˆ. Our
non-discriminatory pricing sets a price pi = pˆ/2 for every agent i. The proof follows similar
lines to the proof of Theorem 3.5 by noticing that all agents are in set B, and by setting
c2 = 2.
C Missing proofs of Section 4.1
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Recall that pˆ is a posted price mechanism offered by the seller.
We show how to transform such a mechanism into a simple mechanism which can be defined
by only two price vectors p0 and p>0 which obtains at least as much revenue. For some
agent i and for some set S ⊆ [i− 1], let qˆSi denote the probability that exactly the set S of
agents purchased the good prior to agent i’s arrival in the mechanism defined by pˆ (and
agent i was offered price pˆi(S)).
We define the exponential strategy space for agent i. Given that a non-empty set S have
bought the good prior to agent i, the agent faces two choices — if the agent buys a good,
her utility is vi − pˆi(S); otherwise, her utility is wi · vi. Rearranging gives us:
TˆSi =
pˆi(S)
1− wi . (23)
Let Tˆ ∅j be the threshold strategy of some agent j arriving after agent i when offered price
pˆj(∅). We now define the threshold strategy Tˆ ∅i . If no agent has bought the good, she again
faces two choice — when buying the good, her utility is vi − pˆi(∅); otherwise, her utility is
wi · Pr [Some agent j > i buys a good] = wi · (1− Pr [No agent j > i buys a good])
= wi ·
1−∏
j>i
Fj(Tˆ ∅j )
 .
Rearranging give us:
Tˆ ∅i =
pˆi(∅)
1− wi + wi
∏
j>i Fj(Tˆ ∅j )
. (24)
We show how to set the price vectors p0 and p>0. Let pMi denote the monopoly price for
agent i, we set p0i = pˆ∅i and p>0i = (1 − wi) · pMi . We denote p = (p0,p>0). Setting these
prices imposes the following threshold strategy for agent i:
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Whenever no agent buys a good prior to agent i’s arrival, her threshold strategy is
T 0i = Tˆ ∅i .
If an agent buys an item prior to agent i’s arrival, her threshold strategy is T>0i = pMi .
Let q0i denote the probability that no agent purchased a good prior to agent i’s arrival in the
mechanism defined by p (and agent i being offered a price p0i ). Note that:
q0i =
∏
j<i
Fj(T 0j ) =
∏
j<i
Fj(Tˆ ∅j ) = qˆ∅i .
The probability that agent i is offered a price (1− wi) · pMi is 1− q0i = 1− qˆ∅i . We conclude:
R(pˆ) =
∑
i
∑
S⊂[i−1]
qˆSi · pˆi(S) · (1− Fi(TˆSi ))
=
∑
i
qˆ∅i · pˆ∅i · (1− Fi(Tˆ ∅i )) +
∑
i
∑
S 6=∅⊂[i−1]
qˆSi · pˆi(S) · (1− Fi(TˆSi ))
=
∑
i
qˆ∅i · pˆ∅i · (1− Fi(Tˆ ∅i )) +
∑
i
∑
S 6=∅⊂[i−1]
qˆSi · (1− wi) · TˆSi · (1− Fi(TˆSi ))
≤
∑
i
qˆ∅i · pˆ∅i · (1− Fi(Tˆ ∅i )) +
∑
i
∑
S 6=∅⊂[i−1]
qˆSi · (1− wi) · pMi · (1− Fi(pMi ))
=
∑
i
qˆ∅i · pˆ∅i · (1− Fi(Tˆ ∅i )) +
∑
i
(1− qˆ∅i ) · (1− wi) · pMi · (1− Fi(pMi ))
=
∑
i
q0i · p0i · (1− Fi(T 0i )) +
∑
i
(1− q0i ) · p>0i · (1− Fi(T>0i ))
= R(p),
where the in inequality follows from the monopoly price definition.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: Let pˆ be a vector such that pˆi is the monopolist price for
distribution Fi. Notice that pˆ = argmaxTR1(T,w) for every w. We set prices p such that
for every i,
p0i = p>0i = (1− wi)pˆi.
We first show that both T 0i and T>0i are both no bigger than pˆi. By Eq. (14), we get
that T>0i = pˆi. By Eq. (15), we get:
T 0i =
p0i
(1− wi) + wi ·
∏
j>i Fj(T 0j )
≤ (1− wi) · pˆi(1− wi) = pˆi.
We get that the revenue from setting prices p is at least:
R(p) =
∑
i
(
q0i · p0i · (1− Fi(T 0i )) + q>0i · p>0i · (1− Fi(T>0i ))
)
≥
∑
i
(
q0i · (1− wi) · pˆi · (1− Fi(pˆi)) + q>0i · (1− wi) · pˆi · (1− Fi(pˆi))
)
=
∑
i
(1− wi) · pˆi · (1− Fi(pˆi))
= R1(pˆ,w)
= max
T
R1(T,w),
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as desired.
Proof of Lemma 4.3: Given price p′, let Tˆ = TF (p′) be a set of thresholds which
induced by p′ in the full externalities model. We set prices p as follows — for every agent i
set:
p0i = p>0i = (1− wi) · Tˆi + wi · Tˆi ·
∏
j>i
Fj(Tˆj),
Note that by the way we set prices, according to Eq. (15), T 0i = Tˆi for every i. We get that
the expected revenue is:
R(p) =
∑
i
(
q0i · p0i · (1− Fi(T 0i )) + q>0i · p>0i · (1− Fi(T>0i ))
)
≥
∑
i
q0i · p0i · (1− Fi(T 0i ))
(15)=
∑
i
q0i ·
(1− wi) · T 0i + wi · T 0i ·∏
j>i
Fj(T 0j )
 · (1− Fi(T 0i ))
≥
∑
i
q0i ·
(1− wi) · T 0i ·∏
j>i
Fj(T 0j ) + wi · T 0i ·
∏
j>i
Fj(T 0j )
 · (1− Fi(T 0i ))
=
∑
i
∏
j<i
Fj(T 0j )
 · T 0i
∏
j>i
Fj(T 0j )
 · (1− Fi(T 0i ))
=
∑
i
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tˆj)
 · Tˆi · (1− Fi(Tˆi))
= Rseq(F ,p′)
Note that in the above, the third equality follows since the probability that agent i will be
offered price p0i , q0i , is exactly the probability that no agent buys a good before i arrives,∏
j<i Fj(T 0j ).
D Proof of Theorem 4.6
Recall that p = (p1, . . . , pn) is the price vector posted by the seller, where pi is the price
offered to agent i, and let T be some equilibrium induced by p (therefore, T satisfies Eq.
(18)). The revenue of the sale when p are the prices and T is equilibrium can be expressed
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by:
R(p,T) =
∑
i
pi · (1− Fi(Ti))
(18)=
∑
i
(1− wi) · Ti + wi · Ti ·∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
 · (1− Fi(Ti))
=
∑
i
(1− wi) · Ti · (1− Fi(Ti)) +
∑
i
wi · Ti ·
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
 · (1− Fi(Ti))
≤
∑
i
(1− wi) · Ti · (1− Fi(Ti)) +
∑
i
Ti ·
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
 · (1− Fi(Ti))
= R1(T,w) +R2(T)
≤ max
Tˆ
R1(Tˆ,w) + max
Tˆ
R2(Tˆ). (25)
We now show that it is possible to find prices that approximate maxTˆR1(Tˆ,w) and
prices that approximate maxTˆR2(Tˆ). This yields a constant approximation for our model.
I Lemma D.1. One can compute prices p such that the expected revenue Rsim(p) ≥
maxTR1(T,w).
Proof: Let pˆ be a vector such that pˆi is the monopolist price for distribution Fi. Notice
that pˆ = argmaxTR1(T,w) for every w. We set prices p such that for every i,
pi = (1− wi) · pˆi.
We first show that in every equilibrium T, Ti ≤ pˆi. By Eq. (18), we get:
Ti
(18)= pi(1− wi) + wi ·
∏
j 6=i Fj(Tj)
≤ (1− wi) · pˆi(1− wi) = pˆi.
We get that for every T, the expected revenue from setting prices p is at least:
R(p,T) =
∑
i
pi · (1− Fi(Ti))
≥
∑
i
(1− wi) · pˆi · (1− Fi(pˆi))
= R1(pˆ,w)
= max
T
R1(T,w),
as desired.
I Lemma D.2. One can compute prices p such that the expected revenue R(p) ≥ Ω(1) ·
maxTR2(T).
Proof: Let pˆ be an anonymous price for which
pˆ ·
(
1−
∏
i
Fi(pˆi)
)
= Ω(1) ·Myer(F) = Ω(1) · R2(F). (26)
This uniform price exists and can be computed according to [4]. We post a uniform price
vector p such pi = pˆ/2 for every i. Let R = pˆ · (1−
∏
i Fi(pˆ)) be the revenue of an anonymous
price mechanism which posts a price p. Given an equilibrium strategy vector T, we have
that the expected revenue is at least pˆ2 · (1−
∏
i Fi(Ti)), since more then one agent might
purchase an item.
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1. Ti ≤ pˆ for every agent i: In this case, since the CDFs are monotonically non-decreasing,
we have that pˆ2 · (1−
∏
i Fi(Ti)) ≥ pˆ2 · (1−
∏
i Fi(pˆ)) = R/2.
2. There exists an agent i such that Ti > pˆ: By the equilibrium condition (18), we have that
Ti = pˆ/2(1−wi)+wi·
∏
j 6=i Fj(Tj)
> pˆ. Which yields (1− wi) + wi ·
∏
j 6=i Fj(Tj) < 12 . We get:
∏
j
Fj(Tj) ≤
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
= (1− wi) ·
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj) + wi ·
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
≤ (1− wi) + wi ·
∏
j 6=i
Fj(Tj)
<
1
2 .
That is, the expected revenue is at least:
pˆ
2 · (1−
∏
i
Fi(Ti)) >
pˆ
4 = Ω(1) ·Myer(F) = Ω(1) · R2(F),
as desired.
The proof of Theorem 4.6 follows from Equation (25), and Lemmata D.1 and D.2.14
E Missing proofs of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.3: As described in Appendix A, let pˆ be a set of near optimal posted
prices used by an OPM, which can be found according to Theorem A.2. We define the prices
of our sequential public model in a way that ensures that for every agent i and for every
j < k, T ji = pˆi (and T
j
i =∞ for j ≥ k). This can be done using the following:
For agent n, set pjn = pˆn · (1− wj) for every j < k, and pjn = ∞ for j ≥ k. Set
rjn,j = Fn(T jn), r
j+1
n,j = 1−Fn(T jn). Notice this enforces the thresholds we described above,
and the rkn,j ’s are matching our definitions.
For agent i < n, given rki+1,j for every j and k, we set p
j
i = pˆi(1−
∑
`≥j w` · r`i+1,j) for
every j < k, and pji =∞ for j ≥ k. Set
rki,j = Fi(T
j
i ) · rki+1,j + (1− Fi(T ji )) · rki+1,j+1.
Given that the rki+1,j ’s are computed correctly, this enforces the thresholds we described
above, and the rki,j ’s also match the computed thresholds.
14This proof gives an approximation factor of 4e+ 1. We note that we can get a factor of ≈ 6.83 using
the EAR prices instead of the anonymous price in the proof of Lemma D.2 via a slightly more involved
proof.
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany
Notice that for every i and j < min(i, k), we have that:
pji = pˆi
1−∑
`≥j
w` · r`i+1,j

≥ pˆi
1− k∑
`=j
wk · r`i+1,j −
n∑
`=k+1
w` · r`i+1,j

= pˆi
1− wk k∑
`=j
r`i+1,j

= pˆi(1− wk), (27)
where the second equality stems from the fact that after selling k items, all prices are set to
∞, which implies that r`i+1,j = 0 for l > k, and the last equality is because
∑k
`=j r
`
i+1,j = 1.
Let q<ki denote the probability that less than k items were sold prior to the arrival of
agent i. Setting the thresholds and prices as described above, we get that the expected
revenue is:
∑
i,j
qi,j · pji · (1− Fi(T ji )) =
∑
i
min(i−1,k−1)∑
j=0
qi,j · pji · (1− Fi(pˆi))
(27)
≥
∑
i
min(i−1,k−1)∑
j=0
qi,j · pˆi(1− wk) · (1− Fi(pˆi))
= (1− wk)
∑
i
q<ki · pˆi · (1− Fi(pˆi))
≥ (w2k+1 − wk)
∑
i
q<ki · pˆi · (1− Fi(pˆi))
≥ (w2k+1 − wk) · Ω(1) · R∗(F ,Uk)
≥ Ω(1) · (w2k+1 − wk) · R∗(F ,U2k+1), (28)
where the first equality stems from the fact that we set T ji = pˆi for j < k, and the third
inequality is because q<ki is exactly the probability that agent i is approached in the posted
price sale with no externalities when using pˆ as prices.
Proof of Lemma 5.4: Let Tˆ be a set of thresholds which approximate R∗seq(F) in the full
externalities model, and let pˆ = T−1F (Tˆ) be the prices for which Tˆ is the equilibrium in that
model. By Theorem 3.6, the revenue achieved using these prices is Θ(1) · R∗(F ,U1); I.e.,
∑
i
∏
j<i
Fj(Tˆj)
 · pˆi · (1− Fi(Tˆi)) = Θ(1) · R∗(F ,U1). (29)
In the model with availability-based externalities, we set prices p such that for every
agent i, T 0i = Tˆi and T
j
i =∞ for every j > 0; I.e., sell to the agent with probability Fi(Tˆi)
only if no agent purchased a good prior to the arrival of the agent. These thresholds can be
computed using the following:
For agent n, set p0n = Tˆn and pjn =∞ for j > 0.
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For agent i < n, set:
p0i = Tˆi · (1−
∑
`≥0
w` · r`i+1,0) = Tˆi · (1− w1 · r1i+1,0) = Tˆi ·
1− w1 ·
1−∏
j>i
Fj(Tˆj)
 , (30)
and pji =∞ for j > 0.
Note that by (30), we have that
p0i = Tˆi ·
1− w1 ·
1−∏
j>i
Fj(Tˆj)
 ≥ Tˆi · (1− (1−∏
j>i
Fj(Tˆj))) = Tˆi ·
∏
j>i
Fj(Tˆj)
(7)= pˆi.
We get that the revenue in the model with availability-based externalities is:∑
i,j
qi,j · pji · (1− Fi(T ji )) =
∑
i
qi,0 · p0i · (1− Fi(T 0i ))
≥
∑
i
∏
j<i
Fj(T 0j )
 pˆi(1− Fi(Tˆi))
=
∑
i
∏
j<i
Fj(Tˆj)
 pˆi(1− Fi(Tˆi))
= Θ(1) · R∗(F ,U1).
F Irregular distributions
Some of our results can be extended to hold for irregular distribution (with a constant loss
in the approximation). In this section we give the key ideas required for these extensions.
F.1 Simultaneous case
Full externalities: In this case, the optimal mechanism for the EAR is no longer a posted
price mechanism, but a mechanism that randomizes over prices. Derandomizing the prices
will not work, since the mechanism might sell more than a single item in expectation. We
observe that our technique of transforming prices as in Theorem 3.5 (i.e., reducing the price
of the expensive items and not selling the inexpensive items) works given any posted price
mechanism that guarantees a good approximation for any order when selling a single private
good. Therefore, the existence of posted prices that obtain half of Myerson’s revenue, as
guaranteed by the prophet inequalities (see [14]), yields an approximation factor of 2 ∗ 5.83.
Status-based externalities: The proof of the status-based externalities follows almost
identically as in the regular case (Theorem 4.6), as the upper bound in Eq. (25) and the
proof of Lemma D.1 still hold. The only difference is in the proof of Lemma D.2, where
one cannot use the anonymous prices devised in [4]. This is because they are only valid for
regular distributions. Instead, one may again use the prices that come out of the prophet
inequalities, and the price transformation used in Theorem 3.5 to prove Lemma D.2.
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F.2 Sequential case
Full externalities: In this case, we note that the mechanism that arises from the prophet
inequalities in the irregular case randomizes over prices. Derandomizing the prices can
generate prices p that guarantee at least half of the optimal revenue, but the item might
be sold with probability greater than half (which breaks the previous proof). However, for
atomless distributions, it is possible to find prices pˆ15 that give a 4-approximation to the
optimal revenue, and that the item is sold with probability at most half. Setting prices that
induce thresholds as in the proof of Theorem 3.6 generates at least a half of the revenue that
can be achieved with pˆ, and therefore give a 8-approximation for the irregular case.
Status-based externalities: The same reduction described in Theorem 4.4 can be used
in the case of irregular distributions. Namely, if there exists a c-approximation algorithm
for the full externalities model, then there is a (c+ 2)-approximation for the status-based
externalities, and therefore a 10-approximation for the irregular case is achievable.
G Logarithmic inapproximability using non-discriminatory prices when
selling goods with status-based externalities
In this section we show that as the wi’s get smaller, posting a single non-discriminatory
price for all agents cannot approximate the optimal revenue obtained by using discriminatory
prices. Namely, when for all i, wi = 0, there is a gap of O(logn) between the revenue
attainable when using a single price and the revenue attainable when using multiple prices.
Consider the setting where agent i’s value is drawn from a uniform distribution Fi =
U
[
1
i ,
1
i− 12
]
. Since for all i, wi = 0, the agents face a private sale, and there is no difference
between the simultaneous and sequential models. Consider a seller that posts a price
pi = 1i for every agent i. The revenue of such a seller is R(F ,p) =
∑
i pi · (1 − Fi(pi)) =∑
i
1
i · (1− Fi(1/i)) ≥ lnn.
Consider now a seller that posts a uniform price p ∈ [ 1n , 2]. Assume that the seller posts
a price p ∈
[
1
j ,
1
j− 12
]
for some j ∈ [n]. The revenue of such a seller is at most
R(F ,p) =
∑
i
p · (1− Fi(p)) ≤ 1
j − 12
·
∑
i
(1− Fi(1/j))
= 1
j − 12
·
∑
i≤j
(1− Fi(1/j)) = j
j − 12
≤ 2.
Therefore, the revenue obtained using discriminatory prices can be greater by a Ω(logn)
factor than the revenue using a non-discriminatory price.
H An example where the optimal revenue is adaptive
We consider the availability based externalities model in sequential sales. When selling goods
with social status-based externalities, we show (Theorem 4.1) that a seller who offers two
prices per agent, one for the case where no agent bought a good, and one for the case where
at least one agent bought a good, is sufficient in attaining optimal revenue. Common wisdom
15This is done by setting pˆi = F−1i (1− 12
∏
j<i
Fj(pj)
Fj(pˆj) · (1− Fi(pi)).
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suggest that for the case of availability-based externalities, posting a price vector per agent,
which indicates the price offered to the agent for any number of agents who bought a good
prior to her arrival, suffices. We show that this is not the case. Namely, we show that for
three agents that arrive sequentially and valuations are all drawn uniformly from [0, 1], the
seller obtains a higher revenue when offering agent 3 a different price when only agent 1
bought a good and when only agent 2 bought a good before she arrived.
We consider the case where the function w which defines the externalities has values
w(0) = 0, w(1) = 0.5 and w(2) = 0.8. In this case, we get that the optimal prices are
p1 = 0.4360554077, p2(∅) = 0.5510244945, p2({1}) = 0.2272487784, p3(∅) = 0.6757323434,
p3({1}) = 0.3119589780, p3({2}) = 0.3040872295 and p3({1, 2}) = 0.1 which yields a revenue
of R1 6=2 = 0.4622033133. When restricting the seller to set prices such that p3({1}) = p3({2}),
we get that the seller maximizes her revenue by setting prices to be p1 = 0.4363307363,
p2(∅) = 0.5511388116, p2({1}) = 0.2265104177, p3(∅) = 0.6758027844, p3({1}) = p3({2}) =
0.3078610708 and p3({1, 2}) = 0.1 which yields a revenue of R1=2 = 0.4621905314 < R1 6=2.
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